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On Europe's anti-gender movements 
Andrea Peto
31 July 2015
As anti-gender movements gain momentum throughout Europe, using the concept
of gender as a technical category may, in the long run, prove more self-
destructive than useful. Andrea Peto argues for the re-enchantment of feminist
politics.
In her recent Eurozine article, Slavenka Drakulic gives a grim overview of the situation
in which women in post-communist Europe after 1989 have found themselves. Very few
would disagree that being (and living) as a woman in Central Europe is no laughing
matter. A glance at the statistical data and gender equality index for this region would
suffice to confirm this view. Like all minorities – Roma, disabled people, migrants, elderly
people or those living under the poverty line – women paid a serious price for the
neoliberal transition of 1989. However, in this article, I argue that there are ways to
change this grim situation, other than what Slavenka Drakulic calls “emancipation after
emancipation”. My suggestion is that progressive actors should instead self-critically
rethink the neoliberal emancipation model and try to re-enchant the doing of feminist
politics in order to reach out to a wider public, instead of blaming others for being
misunderstood (for more on which, see Peto 2015a: 125-32).
This would be a timely task, as progressive, human rights-based secular women’s
movements respond defensively towards the “anti-gender” movements that are gaining
momentum day by day across both eastern Europe, including Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia; and western Europe, including France and Germany. Drakulic blames the
“Catholic Church” for this process, while ignoring the ongoing transformation of the
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church has never been homogenous and is today trying to
transform itself to meet the demands of the twenty-first century, through changing
leadership structures and the inclusion of more women (Marschütz 2014). Be this as it
may, the “anti-gender movement” should be taken seriously; at the same time, we should
also break out of the vicious circle of “emancipation after emancipation” described by
Drakulic, which even in the absence of blossoming “anti-gender movements” is, in the
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long run, the surest recipe for failure.
Why do anti-gender movements matter?
These anti-gender movements are opening up new territory in Europe’s political, cultural
and social landscape, and challenging established political cleavages. Tens of thousands
of people are demonstrating in the streets from Warsaw to Paris against same-sex
marriage, collecting enough signatures for a referendum in Slovakia on controlling the
rights of a group of citizens to marry and to adopt children, and petitioning for a change
in the curriculum that would ban sexual education in Slovakia (Peto/Vasali 2014). On the
one hand, the popular appeal of democratic politics is decreasing: less and less voters
participate in elections and traditional parties have problems recruiting young members.
On the other, the number of women participating in secular, human rights-based
women’s organizations remains the same. So this new anti-gender movement seemingly
solves associated problems of participation.
The result is a new rhetoric of identity formation, outside the received framework of
universal human rights in which gender had found a comfortable space for itself.
However it is only upon first sight that these new movements appear to be anti-gender,
because they attack what they call “gender ideology”. But as careful analysis of five
countries shows (Hungary, France, Germany, Poland and Slovakia – see Kovats and Poim,
Gender as Symbolic Glue, 2015), these movements’ argumentation offers a broad
alternative to established ways of thinking: gender is only the symbolic glue. It remains
an open question as to how progressive politics is to gauge this new political, electoral,
social and cultural trend, and how this trend will influence traditional conservative
politics, itself a product of the European consensus on human rights.
The representatives of anti-gender movements may seem to be arguing purely about
issues of gender policy but actually wish to foster profound change in European political
and value systems. Slavenka Drakulic recognized in her article the signs of this change.
But such change is only possible now that the promise of gender equality has been
broken (in the case of “new Europe”); or has led to too many premature and superficial
changes (in the case of “old Europe”).
Moreover, the anti-gender movement is a global phenomenon. Its global appeal draws on
the fact that various countries increasingly question the universal human rights
framework of politics, including on the grounds of “cultural” exceptionalism. In several
cases, governments in Africa have criticized aid programmes that include the promotion
of reproductive rights for imposing a “gender ideology” and that, according to the same
governments, must be countered in the national context in the spirit of an anti-colonialist
“fight for freedom”. The popularity of these anti-gender movements means that if
progressive politicians wish to understand this major new political trend, they can only
succeed in doing so through the use of a new conceptual framework. These anti-gender
movements are not at all utopian, they do not seek to accomplish gender equality in the
near future. They do not demand “emancipation after emancipation”, but rather focus on
the political temporality of Now. In short, these movements are built on the fundamental




Slavenka Drakulic is not alone in being unfamiliar with the growing body of literature
that analyses “anti-gender” movements. Both the phenomenon and scholarly and political
reflection about it, as well as associated counter-strategies, are very recent. The first
entry in the chronology that Kovats and Poim present in their Gender as Symbolic Glue
volume concerns the 2006 publication in the German conservative newspaper FAZ of an
early article opposing what the author Volker Zastrow calls “gender”. In events
thereafter, the line between conservative and far-right forces quickly becomes blurred.
Progressive political actors are just starting (meaning, during the course of the last two
(!) years) to recognize that they are being pushed into a corner, from the standpoint of
which, they should only act after careful thought (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2015). It is a
political imperative to recognize that anti-gender mobilization is a hegemonic fight, in the
Gramscian sense, for control. For this is what is redefining human rights, and the
progressive European tradition of equality.
The first reactions to anti-gender movements tended to be enlightened and offended,
questioning the ability of the other to understand what gender is. Gender activists then
commenced the first educational campaigns.
The second reaction was of a defensive nature and sought to use the language of gender
equality policy to reinforce the fortress of already existing policy provisions. Elzbieta
Korolczuk pointed out that those scholars using the term “backlash” when characterizing
the anti-gender movement erroneously assumed there to be a broad consensus about
what gender means and what it should achieve (Korolczuk 2014). Korolczuk’s argument
reinforces the view that statements made by Drakulic only scratch the surface, as far as
the impact of neoliberal emancipation is concerned.
The third reaction, parallel to entrenchment, involves blogging and using new social
media to monitor developments inside anti-gender movements. This went hand-in-hand
with remaining vigilant as regards problems in the Catholic Church, which is believed to
be the major initiator and institutional organizer of anti-gender campaigns (Paternotte
2014). It is this reaction that Drakulic describes in her article.
Counter strategies
The main battleground for “gender ideology” turned out to be science. New “scientific
data” is emerging on such topics as the emotional stability of children brought up by
same-sex parents, to mention just one. As Roman Kuhar convincingly argued in his
comparison of developments in Slovenia and Croatia: the anti-gender movement’s use of
“scientific” evidence against “gender ideology” means a paradigm change in science as
we know it. Any scientific data becomes contested, based on normative moral positions.
Kuhar called this strategy the “secularization of the discourse in order to clericalize
society” (Kuhar 2014). The post-modern turn, which introduced a politically informed,
critical and interdisciplinary way of studying science, pointed to the construction of new
knowledge, such that unacknowledged actors needed to be acknowledged from a critical
perspective – with gender being one of these critical perspectives. In this context, science
became a moral and normative category, such that the positionality of the knower
became acknowledged. This approach also questioned the subject-object division and
Page 3/5
prompted the emergence of new symbols as well as new myths and redefinitions. This
positionality – which Eric Hobsbawn referred to thus: “my truth is as valid as your truth”
– signals an anti-universalistic approach leading to a new scientific paradigm that has
since been appropriated by anti-gender forces. However, the visibility of anti-gender
forces and of “naming and shaming” strategies only achieved partial success in the
debate concerning what is scientific according to whom. This in turn only amounted to a
deepening of cleavages, without yielding any real understanding of the depths of the
threat to the infrastructure of human rights and especially without offering new methods
or rhetoric in support of progressive politics as regards both what has been achieved and
how to move forward.
The first step for formulating counter strategies is to create an independent strategy, not
only reacting to the attack. It should be accepted that progressive politics is a result of
the Enlightenment and therefore implies a clear-cut vision of normativity that always
creates minorities, that always engages in “othering”. The European tradition of
Enlightenment is working with normative positions, as Slavenka Drakulic knows –
whether “women in post-communist Europe” (en bloc) laughed or not. Therefore, this anti-
gender campaign is just appropriating the old tools in order to mount a unified attack on
LGBTQ groups with a view to strengthening European Christian cohesion. Magdalena
Sroda, the Polish feminist philosopher said that this fight against “gender ideology” is an
“alliance between church and the stadium”. This statement implies that this anti-gender
movement is only a renewed form of neoliberalist governability based on consumption
and mass control. But it is not only that. This is a fight for redefining neoliberal
representative democracy, and this process is creating new political cleavages; in view of
which, progressive politics needs to have its wits about it.
By now, it should be clear that the anti-gender movement is a new phenomenon in
European politics that thrives on the failures of the neoliberal emancipation project.
Therefore, new methods and frameworks of thinking are required if progressive forces
are to be able to offer meaningful responses. If progressive politics forgets its invaluable
and innovative grass-root origins, it will have to fall back on run-of-the-mill gender
equality policy measures that cannot prevent this new anti-genderism from prevailing in
the long run. As a result, the demand for “emancipation after emancipation” will follow.
The bravery and the originality of those historical political actors who dared to question
what were previously perceived as the unquestionable dogmas of social and political life
should be applied. “Disenchanted” progressive politics should be “re-enchanted” (Peto
2015: 139-45). The most successful mobilizational force of these anti-gender movements
is the new language that they are using for political mobilization. Using the concept of
gender as a technical category can, in the long run, be more self-destructive than useful
in the encounter with this new political challenge. The real new challenge is that never
after 1945 have anti-modernist alternatives received so many votes in democratic
elections, as viable alternatives. The rise of far-right politics is a fact and, in their
electoral success, anti-genderism works as a symbolic glue. No more time should be
wasted by progressive forces on thinking of alternatives. The article by Drakulic is the
first step in that direction, but progressive actors should not stop here.
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